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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

The decision in Brown is a radical change from the majority of
cases 50 and certainly presents a major administrative problem for
the Bureau of Prisons. 5' However, the rehabilitation theory on which
the Youth Act is based calls for special treatment, and by housing and
training a youth offender with an adult offender, the Bureau of Prisons
has not met the quid pro quo of the rehabilitation theory that was
adopted in 1950.52
PAUL F,

RICHARD

LABOR RELATIONS-SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-THE GOOD FAITH
ISSUANCE OF INDIVIDUAL

TEACHING CONTRACTS BY A SCHOOL BOARD
BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS REQUIRED BY
STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE TEACHERS' REPRESENTATION AND NEGOTIATION ACT

Petitioner, Dickinson Education Association 1 (D.E.A.), and Dickinson School District No. 1 (School Board) entered into contract
50. See supra note 27.
51. On October 27, 1977, there were 29,932 inmates confined within the federal prison
system. In May 1977, there were 2,400 male and 264 female, for a total of 2,664 youth
offenders in the system. This made up 9% of the total fe5eral prison population. In
order to comply with the ruling in Brownr, the Bureau of Prisons would be required to
physically move 7,000 plus inmates, involving 43 federal facilities housing youth offenders.
The actual costs are impossible to estimate when one considers the mass disruption of the
inmates involved. "While Brown was not a class action, its policy implications obviously
extend beyond the three individual plaintiffs involved. Accordingly, a Task Force of Bureau
of Prisons employees has been established to re-evaluate our present implementation of the
segregation provisions in Section 5011 of Title 18 of the United States Code." Letter from
Norman A. Carlson, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, to Paul F. Richard (November 1,
1977).
52. 431 F. Supp. at 766, 773.
1. In
February of 1976 the Dickinson Education Association was recognized by the
Dickinson School Board as the exclusive bargaining agent of teachers within its school
system for the purpose of negotiating contracts on their behalf for the 1976-77 school term.
Dickinson Education Ass'n v. Dickinson Public School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d, 205, 208
(N.D. 1977).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-08 (1971), Right to Negotiate, states as follows: "Representative organizations shall have the right to represent the appropriate negotiating unit
in matters of employee relations with the school board. Any teacher, or administrator,
shall have the right to present his view directly to the school board."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-09 (1971), Subject of Negotiations, states as follows: "Tie
scope of representation shall include matters relating to terms and conditions of employment and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to salary, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1971), Good Faith Negotiations, states as follows: "1.
The school board, or its repiresentatives, and the representative organization, selected by the
appropriate negotiating unit, or its representatives, shall have the duty to meet at reasonailo times at the request of either party and to negotiate in good faith with respect to:
(a). Terms and conditions of employment and ernployer-employee relators ..
"
The D.E.A., as exclusive bargaining agent, appealed the finding of the District Court
of Stark County, that the negotiations between it and the S,-hol Board complied with the
good faith reniuirernents of the applicable statutes. 252 N.V.2d 205 (N.D. 1977).
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negotiations in March 1976. The parties agreed that an impasse2
arose as of April 28, 1976. 8 The North Dakota Education Factfinding
Commission4 was contacted and it issued a written report of its
findings and recommendations on June 1, 1976. 5 The parties reached
no agreement on these recommendations. On or about June 18, 1976,
the School Board caused to be issued individual teaching contracts
to all teachers with whom negotiations were being carried on.6 The
D.E.A. contended that the issuance of said contracts had a chilling effect on negotiations and constituted bad faith." On appeal the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that although the School Board
did not complete the negotiation process required by the statute, in
the absence of evidence that such noncompliance was 'the result of
bad faith the School Board's issuance of individual teaching contracts
was not a violation of the Teachers' Representation and Negotiation
Act." Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School
2. Impasse situations are defined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13 (1971) as follows:
1. An impasse shall be deemed to exist under any of the following conditions:
a. Where an agreement as set forth in subdivision b of subsection 1 of
section 15-38.1-12 has not been formulated and after a reasonable period
of negotiation regarding terms and conditions of employment or employeremployee relations, a dispute exists between a school board and any representative organization, an impasse may be deemed to exist.
b. When both parties agree than an impasse exists.
c. In the event that the written agreement reached under section 15-38.1-12
does not include procedures for resolving a dispute which arises, an impasse may be deemed to exist.
d. Written agreements negotiated under section 15-38.1-12 may include
procedures to be invoked in the event of disputes under the contract. Where
such procedures are inadequate to resolve the dispute, an Impasse may be
deemed to exist.
2. An impasse may be resolved in the following manner:
a. The parties may agree upon mediation of the controversy by mutually
selecting a mediator or mediators, and agreeing to a distribution of the
cost of the mediation.
b. If mediation fails or is not attempted, the aggrieved school board or
representative organization may request the commission to render assistance as provided in this section.
3. Dickinson Education Ass'n v. Dickinson Public School Dist. No. 1. 252 N.W.2d 205.
208 (N.D. 1977).
4. The North Dakota Education Factfinding Commission was established by N.D. CENT.
CODs §§ 15-38.1-03 and 15-38.1-04 (1971). The powers of the conmission are generally
stated In N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-05 (1971) which Includes the power to adopt its own
rules and regulations and any other powers authorized by law and under chapter 15-38.1. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13 (1971), which deals with impasse procedures, gives the commission the power to act as a fact-finder on the request of the negotiating parties. The commission will then consider the facts and make its findings and recommendations, or consider the report and recommendation of its appointed factfinier, and, after any further
investigation as it may elect to perform, it will make its findings and recommendation
Within twenty days after the request for factfinding assistance is received, the findings
and recommendations of the commission shall be given to the contending parties and if
the Issue is not then resolved, will be made public in ten days.
5. 252 N.W.2d at 208.
6. Id.
7. Bad faith is defined as follows: "(A] neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or
contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's- rights or duties.
but by some interested or sinister motive." BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 176 (4th ed. 1968).
8. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-38.1 (1971); 252 N.W.2d 205. The dissent found that *he
School Board had committed acts of bad faith. Dealing individually with members of the
bargaining unit is a practice questioned in good faith dealings. The issuance of individual
contracts was found by the dissent to be such a questionable practice. 252 N.W.2d at 215
(Vogel, J., dIssenting).
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Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1977).
Legislation providing for collective bargaining for public employees was first enacted in this country in 1959. In that year the
Wisconsin Legislature spelled out bargaining rights of municipal
employees and established a mechanism for resolving disputes with
employers. 9
During the 1960s union organization and collective bargaining in
public employment reached their peak. 10 During this period there
was continual growth of public employee union membership and
militancy, an increasing incidence of strikes and other "job actions,"' 1 and the passage and amendment of many state laws regarding the right of employees of local governmental units to organ12
ize and to bargain collectively.
,In 1969 teacher disputes, nationally, accounted for a greater percentage of work stoppages in public employment than ever before.'1 3
In addition, in 1968 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
federal government's broad authority under the commerce clause
to regulate the conditions of employment of state and local school
and hospital employees'
In response, thirty-four states passed legislation providing for organization of and collective bargaining for
public employees before 1970.15
The North Dakota Legislature passed the Teachers' Representation and Negotiation Act" in 1969. The purpose of this Act was "to
promote the growth and development of education in North Dakota"
and "to promote the improvement of personnel management and
relations between school boards of public school districts and their
certified employees.' ' 1 7 The Act includes sections that provide for
the following: (1) procedures for representative organizations of
public school teachers to negotiate with school boards with reference
9.
W.VIS.STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977).
10. Cohany & Dewey, Union Membership Among Government Employeea, 93 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 15 (1970).
11. "Job actions" are strikes and other work interference tactics such as near stoppages,

questionable picketing, threats of strikes, "working to rule" and stay-at-home sick dem-

onstrations.
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(1976).
12. Stutz, The Resolution of Impasses in the Public Sector, 1 URB. LAW. 320 (1969). In
1970, the leaders of the major teacher organizations, the National Education Association
and the American Federation of Teachers, predicted that there would be more strikes
that year than in the previous year. Moberly, Causes of Impasse in School Board-Teacher
Negotiations, 21 LAB. L.J. 668 (1970). This prediction caused state legislatures to take a
Serious look at public employee relations in general and teacher relations specifically.
Anderson, Public Employee Bargaining, 1 UPB. LAW. 312, 313 (1969).
13. The statistics indicating this increase are set out in White, Work Stoppages of Governmeutal Employees, 92 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 29 (1969).
14. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The part

of the decision which removed

the exemption previously extended to the States and their political subdivisions with respect
ional
Wirtz
15.
1G.
17.

to employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools has been overruled by NaLeague of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 838 (1976). However, the causal effect of the
decision remains important in the development of public employee labor acts.
See Stutz, supra note 12, at 321.
N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-38.1 (1971).
N.D. CENT. CODE 4 15-38.1-01 (1971).
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to employer-employee relations; 1 (2) procedures to be used in the
event of disagreement; 1 and (3) the establishment of an Education
2
Factfinding Commission . 0

This Act was first interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in 1975 in Edgeley Education Association v. Edgeley Public
School District No. 3.21 In that case, the Education Association of
Edgeley, North Dakota, brought suit alleging that the Edgeley School
Board had tendered contracts to the teachers while negotiations were
still in progress. 22 It was further alleged that this action violated the
Teachers' Representation and Negotiation Act in that it had a chilling
effect on the negotiations and constituted bad faith. 23 The court held
that although the school board, in attempting to follow appropriate
statutes in negotiating with teachers, had overstepped the statutory
requirements, this overreaching had been done in good faith and no
legal rights or privileges had been denied as a result of those ac24
tions.
The court in Edgeley based its interpretation of the statute's good
faith provision 25 on whether the defendant failed to perform any
duties imposed by law. 26 This test represented the court's interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting the statute.2 7 The sections
of the statute are to be construed in pari materia,2 indicating a
need for joint interpretations. The good faith provision was therefore
interpreted in relation to the purpose provision.
The court in Edgeley further considered legislative intent when
looking at the impasse procedures.3 0 The Education Factfinding Commission lacks the statutory authority to bind the negotiating parties.81 As a result, the court surmised that the legislature had intended the negotiating parties or the Education Factfinding Corn18.
19.

N.D. CENT. CODE
15-38.1-12 (1971).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13 (1971).

20.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-03 (1971).

21. 231 N.W.2d 826 (N.D. 1975).
22. Id. at 828.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 833.
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1971). See supra note 2, for quotation of the statute.
26. 231 N.W.2d at 833.
27. Id.
28. In pay mate'ia laws must be construed with reference to each other. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1270 (4th ed. 1968).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-01 (1971), Purpose, provides as follows:
In order to promote the growth and development of education in North Dakota
which Is essential to the welfare of its people, It Is hereby declared to be the
policy of this state to promote the improvement of porsonnel management and
relations between school boards of public school districts and their certified
employees by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public
school certified employees to join organizations of their own choice and be
represented by such organization In their professional and employment relationships with the public school districts.
30. The im-asse provision was not in issue in Edfleleu, but the court found it necessary
to mention It as an example of how it came to its determination of legislative Intent. 231
N.W.2d at 833.
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13 (1971).
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mission to rely on persuasion rather than compulsion. 2
The court in Dickinson was concerned mainly with the procedures
to be followed upon the occurrence of an impasse, 33 and relied
heavily upon Edgeley in coming to its decision.3 4 Upon declaring an
impasse, the parties may request, as they did in Dickinson, that the
North Dakota Education Factfinding Commission prepare a report
and make recommendations. 5 This is the only time the Factfinding
Commission is active in the negotiating process under the statute.3 0
The publication of the Education Factfinding Commission's report, however, does not conclude the contract negotiations.3 7 A school
board is not entitled to issue contracts, as the School Board in Dickinson did after the publication of the Factfinding Commission's report, without concluding the negotiating process.3 8 The court in Dickinson, however, found no indication of bad faith on the part of the
School Board in issuing the contracts.3 9 Rather, they found that noncompliance may have been the result of an incorrect interpretation
of ambiguous statutory language which failed to specify what, if
anything, should occur after the report of the Education Factfinding
Commission has been published.4 0 The court found, however, that
the statutory scheme recognized that there comes a point when a
school board must be allowed to make contractual offers to the
teachers and the teachers must choose either to accept or to reject
such offers.4 1 The court allows the School Board to issue contracts
sometime after the report of the Factfinding Commission has been
made public.4 2 They have not, however, defined any specific time
or set of circumstances that would indicate an acceptable time for
such issuance.
The court indicates that to require negotiations to continue
until a final contract is agreed to would be a major departure from
the prior interpretation of the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature. 43 Any additional interpretations are deferred by the court to
82.
33.
34.
35.

231 N.W.2d at 533.
252 N.W.2d' at 211, 213.
Id. at 209, 213.
See supra note 3. Once ar

impasse situation has been reached, the parties have the

option of agreeing upon a mediator and using this method to resolve their differences or
they may ask the Factfinding Commission to make recommendations. Neither of these
methods are active in the negotiation process until they are called Into use by the parties.
Also, neither has any binding authority on the parties. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13
(1971).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE . 15-38.1-13 (1971).
37. 252 N.W.2d at 211.

38. 252 N.W.2d at 211. The court did not define what the conclusion of the negotiating
process was, nor what was involved in the process.
39.

Id.

40.

Id.

The court prefers to blame ambiguous statutory language for incorrect interpre-

tation rather than saving it was bad faith. It is arguable, however, that in light of the
similar fact situation in Ed.qee,
the statutory language should have been much less ambiguous after once being Interpreted.
41. Id. at 269. This process seems to test the strength of the negotiating unit.
42. Id.

43.

Id. at 213. The court relies heavilv on legislative Intent. The prior statutory inter-
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the legislature." The opinion indicates that because two years had
passed between the Edgeley decision and the Dickinson case, the
legislature would have amended the statute if it had found it neces5
sary.

4

The majority opinion specifically declined to consider the case
law arising from labor relations.46 This reluctance was indicated in
Edgeley and was repeated in Dickinson.47 Cases dealing with the interpretation of federal or state collective bargaining statutes were
considered of little assistance because of dissimilarities between key
provisions in the respective Acts." Decisions involving labor disputes
in the private sector were not found to be of any significant assistance
either.49 The Dickinson court also excluded consideration of the list
of unfair labor practices from the North Dakota Labor-Management
Relations Act 50 and the mediation provisions in Chapter 34-11, Mediation of Disputes Between Public Employers and Employees, 51 because they had been passed separately from the Teachers' Representation and Negotiation Act. The majority found this separate
passage to be an indication that the legislature, for whatever reasons,
wanted to deal with teacher-labor practices differently than either
its treatment of private sector employees or other public sector
employees.52
Justice Vogel, in his dissent, assumes that the legislature, in
creating a system of collective bargaining for teachers, did so with
knowledge of what had gone before in the field of labor relations and
public employees, and legislated accordingly. 53 The dissent also quespretation referred to is Edgeley, which does not give a very broad base from which to work.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) ; Int'l Lales'
Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Miami, 449 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1971), ceit. denied, 407 U.S. 910
(1972) ; NLRB v. Local 254, Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 376 F.2d 131
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967).
47. Dickinson Education Ass'n v. Dickinson Public School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d 205,
213 (N.D. 1977); Edgeley Education Ass'n v. Edgeley Public School Dist. No. 3, 231
N.W.2d 826, 834 (N.D. 1975).
48. Id. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.74 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978) ; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977).
49. 252 N.W.2d at 213.
50. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 34-12 (1972 & Supp. 1977), Labor-Management Relations Act.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-03(1) (1972), defines unfair labor practices for employers as
Interfering with the right of employees to form labor organizations, to discourage or encourage membership through hiring practices, or to refuse to collectively bargain. Unfair
labor practices on the part of labor organizations or its agents are any forms of restraint
or force put on employers to discriminate against employees in their exercise of rights, in
the selection of bargaining representatives or forcing self-employed persons or employers
to join the organization, as well as refusing to bargain collectively or requiring payment
of excessive fees. Id. at § 34-12-0,3(2).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11-01 (1972) provides for the authority of the mediation
board and requires good faith and cooperation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11-02 (1972) provides for the establishment of a mediation board and the selection of a chairperson. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-11-03 (1972)
defines the duties of the mediation board and states the
effect of the ,determination of the issues and the recommendations.
52. 252 N.W.2d at 213.
53. Id. at 215.
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tions the manner in which the court interpreted the negotiation procedures, 54 and briefly summarized the majority opinion as follows:
Anyone reading the majority opinion without reading
[North Dakota Century Code chapter 15-38.1], would think
that the statute provided for something called a "good-faith
negotiation process" which could be terminated by the publication of the findings of the Education Factfinding Commission, that thereafter the representation of teachers by their
chosen representative organization and bargaining unit was
at an end, and that the School Board became free to negotiate with teachers individually. 55
The dissent continued by explaining why such an interpretation
would be incorrect. The basis of the explanation was the fact that
termination of good faith bargaining between the representatives
and consent to bargain individually with organization members are
not mentioned in the statute. 56 It is further pointed out by the dissent that dealing individually with members of bargaining units
cannot be done in good faith,5 7 and that once a duty to bargain in good
faith is established as in the Teachers' Representation and Negotiation Act it continues regardless of whether or not agreement is
reached.5s The Dickinson interpretation does not define what steps
follow the report of the Education Factfinding Commission except
to say the process continues until agreement is reached. 59
The court's interpretation of the Teachers' Representation and
Negotiation Act should limit times, qualify effects, and define practices and procedures of the Act in line with case law and statutes relating to the field of labor relations. 6 A failure on the part of the
court to give a meaningful interpretation to the statute that is in
line with other labor related statutes nullifies the intended purpose
of the statute and returns teacher-school board relations to their pre.
1969 status. The legislature should likewise reconsider the Act using
both Edgeley and Dickinson as guides to point out problem areas
that require clarification and additional procedures. The Act should
be amended to alleviate problem areas and put meaning into the
negotiation process. Such actions would hasten the "growth and
54. Id. at 214, 215.
55. Id. at 214.
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1971).
57. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). This has been held to be
an unfair labor practice, id. at 684, even In the absence of bad faith. NLRB v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. of Miami, 449 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972).
58. 252 N.W.2d at 215.
59. Id. at 213.
60. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-38.1 (1971) should be construed in light of both N.D.
CENT. CODE ch. 34-12 (1971) and N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 34-11 (1972) as well as other statu.
tory case law available. Id.
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development of education in North Dakota which is essential to the
welfare of its people. .. .
SIMONE SANDBERG

SHOP ACT-TAVERN
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-DRAM
LIABLE FOR INJURIES OF AN INTOXICATED PATRON

OWNER

HELD

While decedent was a patron of defendants'1 bar, defendants or
their employees served alcohol to decedent which, resulted in decedent''S intoxication. While intoxicated, decedent engaged in activities
which resulted in injuries which caused his death.3 Plaintiff4
brought an action under Michigan's wrongful death act, 5 alleging
that defendants knew decedent was an alcoholic, had agreed not to
serve decedent any alcoholic beverages, and that therefore defendants were guilty of gross negligence and willfull wanton and intentional misconduct in serving the decedent. 6 Defendants filed a mo-

tion for summary judgment based on Michigan's dram shop act,?
61.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-01 (1971).

1. At the time the action was brought defendants owned the bar in which decedent
was allegedly served alcoholic beverages. Redford Township, a Michigan Public Body
Corporation, was also a defendant but was not involved in the appeal. Grasser v. Fleming.
74 Mich. App. 338, -,
253 N.W.2d 757, 758 (1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Plaintiff was executrix of her deceased father's estate. IE.
5. Id. Michigan's wrongful death act, Micn. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.2921 (Supp. 1977)
states as follows:
All actions and claims survive death. Actions on claims for injuries which
result in death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the injured person
except pursuant to the next section. If an action is pending at the time of
death the claim may be amended to bring it unier the next section. A failure
to so amend will amount to a waiver of the claim for additional damages resulting from death.
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(1) (1968) states as follows:
Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death shall be caused
by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect, or default Is such as
would, If death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages, in respect thereof, then and In every such
case, the person who or the corporation which would have been liable, if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount In law to felony. All actions for such
death, or injuries resulting In death, shall be brought only under this section.
6. 74 Mich. App. at -,
253 N.W.2d at 758.
7. Id. Michigan's dramshop act, MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1977) states
as follows:
Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other persons who shall be
Injured In person or property, means of support or otherwise, by a visibly
intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing to
any such persons any Intoxicating liquor and the sale Is proven' to be a proximate cause of the injury or death, shall have a right of action In his or her
name against the person who shall by such selling or giving any such liquor
have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons who
shall have caused or contributed to any such injury and the principal and

